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Abstract
Modal logic has been applied in many different areas, as reason-
ing about time, knowledge and belief, necessity and possibility, to
mention only some examples. In the present paper, an attempt is
made to use modal logic to account for the semantics of theoreti-
cal sentences in scientific language. Theoretical sentences have been
studied extensively since the work of Ramsey and Carnap. The
present attempt at a modal analysis is motivated by there being
several intended interpretations of the theoretical terms once these
terms are introduced through the axioms of a theory.
Keywords: Theoretical terms, modal logic, Ramsey sentence.
1 Introduction
A theoretical term is a non-logical symbol whose meaning is introduced through
axioms of a theory which - at least prima facie - do not count as definitions. One
of the few attempts at a characterization of theoretical terms by formal means
was made by Ramsey in his (1950). Another way of accounting for the semantic
peculiarities of theoretical terms will be expounded in the present paper. This
account is based on Carnap’s notion of an indirect interpretation of theoretical
terms by postulates. It is akin to the Ramsey view but, at the same time, apt to
overcome certain difficulties inherent in this view when it comes to the formal
representation of the claim that a theoretical sentence is true.
What is the connection between theoretical terms and modal logic? The truth-
rules for theoretical sentences, as they will be expounded here, show a striking
similarity to the rules for the box operator in modal logic. For this reason,
we are speaking of a modal view of the semantics of theoretical sentences. An
explicit modal notation for the assertion of theoretical sentences in this view
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will be given. It will also be shown that the modal view represents deductive
reasoning with theoretical sentences more properly than the Ramsey view does.
Following upon a representation of the Ramsey view in section 2 is the exposition
of the modal view in section 3. In section 4, two notations for the assertion of
a theoretical sentence are introduced. These notations can be seen to represent
the semantics of such sentences. Deductive reasoning with theoretical sentences
is addressed in section 5. In section 6, we deal with competing theories, showing
that the modal view allows for a theory-immanent notion of truth.
2 The Ramsey View
For an outline of the Ramsey view of scientific theories, some notational con-
ventions need to be introduced. These conventions will also be used in the
remainder of the paper. Essential to Ramsey’s and other accounts of scientific
language is the division of non-logical symbols into a set Vo of observational
terms and another set Vt of theoretical terms. A theory TC may be formulated
in a language L(Vo, Vt). Both the observational language L(Vo) and the theo-
retical language L(Vo, Vt), which contains L(Vo) as a fragment, are assumed to
be of first order. The symbol TC stands for a conjunction of axioms, where
the T-axioms contain only Vt terms as non-logical symbols, while the C-axioms
contain both Vo and Vt terms. We will use ΦTC to refer to the set of T- and C-
axioms. A theory may be given either as the conjunction of its T- and C-axioms
or as the set of these axioms.
The Ramsey sentence of a theory TC in the language L(Vo, Vt) is obtained by
the following transformations of the conjunction of T- and C-axioms. First,
replace the theoretical terms in this conjunction by appropriate second order
variables. Then, bind these variables by second order existential quantifiers. As
result one obtains a second order sentence of the following form:
(TCR) ∃X1 . . . ∃XnTC(n1, . . . , nk, X1, . . . , Xn)
where X1, . . . , Xn are second order variables and n1, . . . , nk non-logical symbols
of L(Vo).
TCR is also called the Ramsey sentence of a theory TC. If one thinks that
TCR should be preferred to TC as a proposition of the theory TC, one holds
the Ramsey view of scientific theories. This view differs from the standard one
with regard to whether the axioms ΦTC are considered individually meaningful
statements. This is affirmed in the standard view but denied in the Ramsey
view.
Of Ramsey’s original exposition it seems justified to say that the second order
variables are ranging over sets of individuals of the observational domain Do.
This assumption is not inherent in the Ramsey view as we may also assume that
there is a domain Dt of theoretical entities and that it is, first, sets of n-tuples of
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individuals of Dt and, second, sets of n-tuples of individuals of both Dt and Do
that the second order variables are ranging over. The latter option was pursued
by Carnap (1958)/(1975) and was recently taken in an account of the subject
matter by Ketland (2004). It is also adopted in the present investigation. It is
assumed, furthermore, that Vt contains either no individual constants or only
mathematical ones whose interpretation does not vary.1 In any case, there are
no individual constants being subject to the method of existential quantification
through which the Ramsey sentence is obtained.
Why should one prefer the Ramsey view to the standard one? In what follows,
we will discuss two interrelated reasons for such a preference. One of these
concerns the question of whether atomic theoretical sentences are individually
meaningful, and the other an epistemological problem inherent in the standard
view.
In the Ramsey view, it is denied that an atomic theoretical sentence is individ-
ually meaningful. For, once the theoretical terms are replaced by appropriate
second order variables, we lack the expressive resources to use such a sentence
for the purpose of making an assertion. Rather, the assertion of a theoretical
sentence φ has to be expressed by putting φ into the scope of the quantifiers
of the Ramsey sentence. More precisely, Ramsey seems to give the following
instruction of how to translate a theoretical sentence φ in the standard view
into a corresponding sentence in the Ramsey view:
(1)
∃X1 . . . ∃Xn(TC(n1, . . . , nk, X1, . . . , Xn) ∧ φa([X1/t1], . . . ,
[Xn/tn]) ∧ φ([X1/t1], . . . , [Xn/tn]))
where φa stands for the conjunction of sentences which are affirmed already in
the language, in addition to the axioms of TC, and φa([X1/t1], . . . , [Xn/tn]) for
the formula that is obtained by replacing every occurrence of a theoretical term
in φa with its corresponding second order variable. Likewise, φ([X1/t1], . . . ,
[Xn/tn]) is obtained through this procedure of replacing theoretical terms with
second order variables. (See Ramsey (1950), p. 231n.) Henceforth, we shall
write (TC ∧ φa ∧ φ)R to refer to a sentence of the form (1).
It is nevertheless questionable whether (TC ∧ φa ∧ φ)R is an appropriate repre-
sentation of the meaning of φ. For, as Ramsey points out, it may well be the
case that (TC ∧ φa ∧ φ)R is true, while (TC ∧ φa ∧ ¬φ)R is also true. In this
case, φ and ¬φ would have to be considered true in the Ramsey view. To avoid
this, Ramsey says that a theoretical sentence φ means the difference between
(TC ∧ φa ∧ φ)R and (TC ∧ φa)R.2 It is not quite clear whether Ramsey himself
distinguished between the meaning of a theoretical sentence and the meaning
of an assertion of such a sentence. As we understand his line of thought, there
is no difference. For, the meaning of a sentence is that kind of property we
1The latter assumption was made by Carnap (1958)/(1975).
2It should be noted that, in later discussions of Ramsification, φa, the set of assertions that
are made in the context of a given theory, is not taken into account. Nor will φa be considered
to account for the meaning of theoretical sentences in the modal view to be developed in the
present paper.
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are concerned with in understanding the assertion of a sentence. In section 4,
we will analyze the formal means for representing the assertion of a theoretical
sentence with the intent to explicate the meaning of such a sentence.
Ramsey’s instruction of how to translate a theoretical sentence φ makes the
meaning of such a sentence dependent on the axioms ΦTC and on which other
sentences are affirmed. The Ramsey view may therefore be seen as a first at-
tempt to give a context theory of meaning in which the meaning of a theoretical
sentence depends on the theoretical context in which it is being asserted. In
this case, the meaning of a theoretical sentence is not solely compositionally
determined by the meaning of the component expressions occurring in that sen-
tence. The theoretical context is given by a scientific theory conferring meaning
on scientific expressions and by theoretical assertions represented by φa. Ram-
sey himself expresses the contextual dependencies of the meaning of theoretical
sentences by figurative ways of speaking (Ramsey (1950), p. 231):
Any additions to the theory, whether in the form of new axioms or
particular assertions like α(0, 3), are to be made within the scope of
the original α, β, γ. They are not, therefore, strictly propositions by
themselves just as the different sentences in a story beginning ‘Once
upon a time’ have not complete meanings and so are not propositions
by themselves.
It appears that Ramsey himself considered this point crucially important as his
analysis of the contextual aspect of sentence meaning follows immediately upon
his proposal to take TCR as the proposition of a theory in place of TC.
Let us now move to epistemological considerations lending support to the Ram-
sey view. Sneed (1979) discovered a serious problem inherent in the standard
view but not arising in the Ramsey view. This problem concerns the mutual
dependency of the extension of the axioms ΦTC and the extension of the theo-
retical terms. On the one hand, we are to know the values of a theoretical term t
in order to find out whether the sentences of ΦTC are true. On the other hand,
it is simply impossible to determine the extension of t without assuming the
truth of some sentence of ΦTC in advance. This epistemological circle has been
termed the problem of theoretical terms by Sneed. Importantly, it does not arise
in the Ramsey view. For, by TCR it is only claimed that there are extensions of
the theoretical terms satisfying the postulates ΦTC under a given interpretation
of L(Vo), but no claim is made by TCR whether or not the sentences of ΦTC
are true. For a thorough discussion see Sneed (1979), p. 30–40.
What Sneed has expounded as the problem of theoretical terms may show that
the standard view leads to insurmountable epistemological difficulties so that
agnosticism about scientific theories is inevitable under this view. Holistic and
context theories of meaning have gained wide ranging acceptance among philoso-
phers of science since Quine’s (1961) and subsequent work as well as Feyer-
abend’s (1962), but are expounded in many cases in a rather informal fashion.
What is the relative merit of context theories of meaning in comparison to the
standard semantics, in which every sentence is considered individually meaning-
ful? To give a brief answer, context theories of meaning seem to accord much
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better with the manner we do grasp the meaning of scientific concepts than
standard semantics does. Concepts, such as force or electromagnetic field, are
introduced to the novice in the field through axioms of a scientific theory and
thus explained in the context of such a theory. It is those axioms on which we
rely on in measuring the quantities corresponding to scientific concepts. Hence,
we can say that it is through these axioms that we grasp the meaning of scien-
tific concepts. That our semantic theories may account for how speakers grasp
the meaning of scientific concepts is a requirement on which Dummett (1991),
p. 340, insisted with great emphasis. Of course, one is free to reject this re-
quirement, but then it becomes questionable of what the explanatory value of
our semantic theories consists in.
Upon this appraisal of the Ramsey view two critical notes may be sounded.
First, it is hard to see how our logical practice of using a theoretical sentence φ
in derivations accords with Ramsey’s proposal to transform the assertion of such
a sentence into the Ramsey view, that is, to assert (TC ∧ φa ∧ φ)R in place of
φ. The notation suggested by Ramsey is obviously not the one used in science.
Adopting it would lead to highly complex expressions that seem unsuitable
for our inferential practice.3 Second, Ramsey’s proposal for accounting for the
meaning of a theoretical sentence φ cannot be seen as a formal representation
as it refers merely to the difference between two formal notations, i. e., to the
difference between (TC ∧ φa ∧ φ)R and (TC ∧ φa)R. Our aim in the next
two sections will be to give a model-theoretic notation for asserting theoretical
sentences that has the merits of the Ramsey view, as just explained, but allows
a much simpler notation for the assertion of theoretical sentences.
3 A Modal View
As indicated above, the sentences that bestow meaning on a theoretical term by
way of an interpretation do - at least prima facie - not qualify as definitions in
the strict sense the term definition is understood in mathematical logic. This is
what makes explanation of the interpretation of theoretical terms difficult. It is
tempting to think that the Ramsey view is the only way of accounting for the
semantics of theoretical terms. Another view shall, however, be expounded in
this section. This view draws heavily on Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language
(1937) as well as his Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (1939). What fol-
lows is a condensed exposition of an account that has been developed elsewhere
in greater detail. (See Andreas (2007), p. 97-164.)
3Arguably, this problem can be solved by taking TCR as the empirical claim of the theory
and TCR → TC as the single postulate conferring meaning on the theoretical terms. Then,
TC can be inferred from these two sentences. This proposal was made by Carnap in his
(1958)/(1975). It should be noted, however, that the proposal is motivated by a semantic
explanation of how to understand the postulate TCR → TC, which is given in an informal
fashion and not covered by Carnap’s technical work on predicate logic. Even though the
modal view presented in the next section is designed to apply to the postulates ΦTC , it is also
applicable to the single postulate TCR → TC. It may therefore be seen as clarifying Carnap’s
informal explanation of how the interpretation of theoretical terms can be determined by this
postulate.
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In his (1939), p. 65-69, Carnap introduced the notion of an indirect interpreta-
tion of a non-logical symbol as follows. This notion is to be understood against
the background of a direct interpretation. The interpretation of a non-logical
symbol is direct if it consists in an assignment of an extension or an inten-
sion to that symbol and is given by an expression of the meta-language. By
contrast, the interpretation of a non-logical symbol is indirect if it is given by
one or several sentences of the object language which have the status of being
non-logical axioms in the calculus. Carnap’s explanation of the logical status of
postulates mainly concerns their syntactic function: Postulates are, according
to Carnap, non-logical axioms which are taken to be valid in the calculus and
which therefore can be used in every derivation, as is the case with a definition.
Let us now, in addition to Carnap’s syntactic explanation, move the focus onto
the semantic function of postulates. We propose to adopt the following expla-
nation:
Explanation 1. A set ΦTC of postulates that interprets a set Vt of theoretical
terms on the basis of a language L(Vo) imposes a constraint on the intended in-
terpretations of the language L(Vo, Vt). This means, in terms of model-theoretic
semantics, that every admissible L(Vo, Vt) structure must satisfy ΦTC . The ad-
missible L(Vo, Vt) structures may have two domains of interpretation, one ob-
servational domain Do and a domain of theoretical entities Dt. With respect to
a given L(Vo) structure A, there may be several L(Vo, Vt) structures that extend
A and satisfy ΦTC .
This explanation can be motivated by an analysis of the similarities and dis-
similarities between the concept of a definition and the concept of a postulate
(Andreas (2007)). It is important to note that we cannot expect the interpre-
tation of a symbol through postulates to result in a unique determination of
the extension of this symbol. This contrasts sharply with the interpretation of
a symbol through a definition. In the case of a definition, the uniqueness of
interpretation is an implication of Beth’s definability theorem. (For discussion
of this point see also van Benthem (1978), p. 332.)
Why does the interpretation of theoretical terms through postulates not result
in a unique determination of the extension of these terms? One can verify the
proposition of non-uniqueness for several quantities in physics, as mass, force,
temperature, or the intensity of the electromagnetic field. Further, Ramsey
(1950) and Braithwaite (1955) tried to show that certain attempts to define
theoretical terms would block the growth of the respective scientific theory. That
the extension of theoretical terms is not uniquely determined is also implicit in
Ramsey’s claim that both (TC ∧ Φa ∧ φ)R and (TC ∧ Φa ∧ ¬φ)R may well be
true. Finally, it can be shown that the proposition of non-uniqueness concerning
the interpretation of theoretical terms is an implication of Carnap’s doctrine of
partial interpretation (Andreas (2007), p. 157). In retrospect, we can say that
the Ramsey view has the merit of not requiring the extension of theoretical
terms to be uniquely determined.4
4David Lewis attempted to define theoretical terms by means of a definite description in
his (1970). For a critical discussion of this attempt see Schurz (2005). Schurz, convincingly,
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In Carnap’s so-called dual-level conception of scientific language, on which we
are aiming to elaborate, the interpretation of the observational language is as-
sumed to be determined uniquely by rules of designation reflecting the intended
interpretation of L(Vo). There is thus a twofold constraint on the intended in-
terpretations of L(Vo, Vt), one by the interpretation of L(Vo) and another by the
postulates ΦTC . In other words, a L(Vo, Vt) structure is admissible iff it satisfies
the postulates and extends the intended interpretation of L(Vo) to include an
interpretation of the theoretical terms Vt.
From such an understanding of an admissible structure, truth rules for the-
oretical sentences may be set up as follows. Let Ao designate the intended
interpretation of the observational language.5 Let MOD(ΦTC) designate the
set of L(Vo, Vt) structures that satisfy the postulates ΦTC and EXT(Ao, Vt,
Dt) the L(Vo, Vt) structures that extend Ao to interpret the Vt symbols, where
these symbols are allowed to have argument positions that are interpreted in Dt.
More precisely, a L(Vo, Vt) structure is a quadruple (Do, Dt, ao, at), where Do
designates the domain of interpretation of observational terms, ao the interpre-
tation function for observational terms, and at the interpretation function for
theoretical terms. The latter kind of terms have at least one argument position
that is interpreted in Dt. Every extension of a given L(Vo) structure A must, by
definition, agree with A on the interpretation of the Vo symbols. A theoretical
sentence is one in which at least one theoretical term occurs. Then, the truth
of such a sentence is defined by the following definitions:
Definition 1. Sa designates the set of L(Vo, Vt) structures that are admissible




MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt)
if MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) 6= ∅,
EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) if MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) = ∅.
Definition 2. ν(φ) is the function that assigns truth-values to theoretical sen-
tences of L(Vo, Vt). It is defined as follows:
i) ν(φ) := T iff for every structure A ∈ Sa, A |= φ holds
argues that Lewis’s proposal only works on the assumption that the second order variables
of the Ramsey sentence are ranging over intensions, i. e, entities determining the extension
of theoretical terms. This would result in a deviation from standard second order logic.
Eventually, one should discuss whether intensions - in the sense of entities determining the
extension of theoretical terms - are better viewed as individuals.
5Ao is thought of here as identical to the corresponding intended interpretation of the
observational language in the Ramsey view. In discussions of this view, it is usually not
made explicit whether or not this interpretation is such that it determines the truth-value
of every L(Vo) sentence, including all observable truths of the future world history. Our
impression is that such an assumption is implicitly made. Alternatively, Ao may be restricted
to interpretations that determine the truth-values of L(Vo) sentences concerning the observable
world until the present time. Which decision is made seems, however, not essential in the
context of the present paper.
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ii) ν(φ) := F iff for every structure A ∈ Sa, A |= φ does not hold
iii) ν(φ) is indeterminate iff there is at least one structure A1 for which A1 |= φ
holds true and at least another structure A2 for which A2 |= φ does not hold
true, where both A1 and A2 are members of Sa, the set of admissible structures.
The idea behind these rules is rather simple. A theoretical sentence is true
iff it is true in every admissible structure. A theoretical sentence is false iff
it is false in every admissible structure. And a sentence has no determinate
truth-value iff it is true in - at least - one admissible structure and false in - at
least - another structure being also admissible. Obviously, the truth-rules allow
theoretical sentences to have determinate values even in the absence of a unique
determination of theoretical terms by postulates. It should be noted further
that the truth-value of a logically true or logically false theoretical sentence is
not altered if definition 2 is adopted. As is obvious from part iii) of definition
2, there are also theoretical sentences that cannot be assigned to a determinate
truth-value.6
In a case where there is no structure that extends Ao and satisfies the postulates
ΦTC , it is not sensible to impose a constraint on the L(Vo, Vt) interpretations
by the postulates. Then, the intended interpretation of the theoretical terms
collapses. There are several options on how to formally represent such a failure
of interpretation. To consider every member of EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) admissible is
only one such option. This choice has the merit of not affecting the interpreta-
tion of the observational language. Another option to formally account for the
case where the intended interpretation of theoretical terms collapses - because
of MOD(Φp) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) being empty - is to assign every theoretical
sentence the value false. Such a choice has the disadvantage that the law of
excluded middle would not hold for theoretical sentences. If we were to set ev-
ery theoretical sentence to false in case of MOD(Φp) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) being
empty, then we would have to come up with two logically calculuses, one for the
case where MOD(Φp)∩EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) is empty, and another where it is not.
For the definition of the set Sa of admissible structures it has been assumed that
the domain Dt, in which the theoretical terms are interpreted, does not vary.
This assumption is justified in the framework of Carnap’s dual-level conception
of scientific language. For, there it is assumed that the individual constants
6These truth-rules are inspired by supervaluation logic and we are deeply indebted to
Priest’s (2001) exposition of this logic. In using supervaluations for a formal account of
vagueness, the notion of supertruth has been introduced by Williamson (1994), p. 142–153,
and others. This notion formally coincides with the notion of truth being defined by the above
truth-rules. Elsewhere, we dealt with supervaluations and theoretical terms in the framework
of truth-value-semantics in the sense of LeBlanc (1976). See Andreas (2008). This treatment
is somewhat more tedious than the one given in the present paper.
As in certain versions of supervaluation logic, a set Sa of admissible structures may well
verify a disjunction without verifying either disjunct, or verify an existential quantification
without verifying any instance of it. This amounts to a deviation from what philosopher’s
have called a common sense view of the world. Likewise, the idea of representing a part of
the world through a set of structures that has usually more than one member as opposed to
representing it through a single structure is a deviation from common sense. The very nature
of theoretical terms - more precisely, the non-uniqueness of their interpretation - requires such
a deviation.
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of Vt are mathematical symbols having a determinate interpretation. If Dt
is supposed to contain spatiotemporal theoretical entities, such as electrons,
atoms, or molecules, it may justified to modify the definition of Sa such that a
structure is admissible iff it extends Ao and satisfies the postulates, where Vt
is interpreted in some domain Dt. Whether or not Dt is considered constant is
not essential to the modal view to be developed. Our preference for a constant
domain of theoretical entities goes back to Carnap (1958)/(1975) but may well
be discarded.
In a certain sense, the problem of how to deal with theoretical sentences whose
terms are not properly interpreted is similar to the problem that arises in the
case of sentences with proper names without referents, as in sentences about
the present king of France. In both cases we are concerned with sentences in
which at least one term occurs that cannot be interpreted in the intended way.
Considering such sentences having no determinate truth-value is one option,
considering them false another.
Even though the primary function of postulates is to interpret theoretical terms,
the truth-value assignment to sentences that are postulates is not entirely void
of empirical content. According to the truth-rules for theoretical sentences
in definition 2, a sentence being a member of ΦTC is true if MOD(ΦTC) ∩
EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) is not empty. Further, it holds that every member of ΦTC is
assigned to the value true iff there is a structure extending Ao and satisfying
the postulates ΦTC . Whether or not there is such a structure also depends on
Ao, and hence on empirical facts. The criteria according to which the epistemic
quality of a system of postulates can be judged may be summarized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. A theory may be given as a set of postulates ΦTC . As rules
for the truth-value assignment to theoretical sentences the rules in definition 2
are adopted. Then, the following criteria are equivalent:
i) Every φ ∈ ΦTC is assigned to the value true
ii) MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is not empty
iii) TCR is true.
Equivalence between i) and ii): For the left-to-right direction, assume that
every φ ∈ ΦTC is assigned to the value true. As assumption of the indirect
proof, suppose MOD(ΦTC)∩ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is empty so that Sa = EXT(Ao,
Vt, Dt). Let A1 be any member of Sa. Then, we can infer from ν(φ) = T
for every φ ∈ ΦTC and definition 2 that A1 |= φ for every φ ∈ ΦTC . Hence,
A1 ∈ MOD(ΦTC). Because of this and A1 ∈ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt), MOD(ΦTC) ∩
EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is not empty. Contradiction. The right-to-left direction of the
proof is trivial.
Equivalence between ii) and iii): For the left-to-right direction, assume that
MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is not empty. Then, there is a structure
A = (Do, Dt, ao, at) such that A |= ΦTC , where A0 = (Do, ao) is the intended
interpretation of L(Vo). Then, obviously, there is an assignment to the second
order variables in the open formula TC(n1, . . . , nk, X1, . . . , Xn) such that this
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formula is assigned to the value true, where the Vo symbols are interpreted ac-
cording to Ao. (Simply take the interpretation of the Vt terms, as given by the
structure A, as assignment to the second order variables using the correspon-
dence between these variables and Vt terms.) Hence, (Do, Dt, ao) |= (TC)R. For
the right-to-left direction, assume (Do, Dt, ao) |= (TC)R, where Ao = (Do, ao) is
the intended interpretation of L(Vo). Then, there is an assignment of values to
the second order variables of the open formula TC(n1, . . . , nk, X1, . . . , Xn) such
that this formula is assigned to the value true. If this assignment is taken as an
interpretation of the Vt terms using the correspondence between the variables
of (TC)R and theoretical terms, while the Vo terms are interpreted according
to Ao, then every sentence of ΦTC comes out true under this interpretation.
Call the functions representing this interpretation of the Vt terms at1. Then,
(Do, Dt, ao, at1) is an extension of the intended interpretation of L(Vo) and also
satisfying the postulates ΦTC . Hence, MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is not
empty.
Why would it not be correct in general to claim that φ ∈ ΦTC is true iff
MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is not empty? This is because in the case
of a C-axiom, that is, an axiom having occurrences of both Vt and Vo symbols,
it may happen that this axiom holds true in every A ∈ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt).
Why did we come to label the present account of the semantics of theoretical
sentences as a modal view? Now, the truth-rules of definition 2, obviously, show
a striking similarity to the rules for the box operator in simple modal systems
in which the accessibility relation is an equivalence relation and every world is
accessible from any other. Such a system is based on the idea that a proposition
is necessarily true iff it is true in every possible world. In a likewise manner, a
theoretical sentence is assigned to the value true iff this sentence is true in every
admissible structure. An explicit modal notation for this view will be given in
the next section.
It seems worth noting that Mikenberg et al. (1986) and Da Costa and French
(1990) introduced a notion of pragmatic truth whose definition resembles the
model-theoretic restatement of the Ramsey sentence given by clause ii) of propo-
sition 1. More precisely, a sentence φ is said to be pragmatically true in a struc-
ture A (relative to a set P of sentences) if there exists a total extension B of A
such that B |= φ and, for every ψ ∈ P, B |= ψ. If φ is not pragmatically true
in A, it is said to be pragmatically false in A relative to P (Mikenberg et al.
(1986), p. 204). P is a set of primary statements which need not be observa-
tional but whose truth must be understood in the correspondence sense. If the
concept of pragmatic truth is only applied to whole theories, which seems to
be the intention of Da Costa and French (1990), p. 257, then it is equivalent to
the model-theoretic restatement of the Ramsey sentence, with the qualification
that a set P of primary statements needs to be satisfied by an extension of A
satisfying the theory. If the pragmatic conception of truth is also applied to
scientific statements other than axioms of a theory, which seems to be intended
by Mikenberg et al. (1986), p. 204, it leads to plain contradictions. For, there
may well be an extension of A satisfying P in which φ is true and another one
also satisfying P in which ¬φ is true as well. Then, both φ and ¬φ would have to
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be considered pragmatically true in A relative to P . This type of contradiction
has been circumvented in the modal view.
4 Asserting Theoretical Sentences
We are now in a position to say how the assertion of a theoretical sentence can
be represented in a model-theoretic fashion. For this purpose, we propose to
adopt the following notation for the assertion of any L(Vo, Vt) sentence:
(2) Sa |=m φ.
In words: For all structures A ∈ Sa it holds that A |= φ, where Sa, the set
of admissible structures, is defined by definition 1. This notation is primarily
intended to represent the assertion of those theoretical sentences that are not
postulates. Even so, it does also represent the assignment of truth-values to sen-
tences that are postulates, provided the truth-rules in definition 2 are adopted
for such sentences. Moreover, the notation applies to observational sentences
because, for all sentences φ of L(Vo), Sa |=m φ iff Ao |= φ, where Ao is the
intended interpretation of the observational language.
In having given an explicit, semantically well founded notation for asserting the-
oretical sentences, the major goal of the present paper has been achieved. This
goal is motivated by the difficulties arising in the Ramsey view when it comes to
representing the meaning of a theoretical sentence. Ramsey’s proposal to take
such a sentence φ to mean the difference between (TC∧φa∧φ)R and (TC∧φa)R
was found cumbersome and, more importantly, not sufficiently formal for our
use. These shortcomings of the Ramsey view appear to have overcome in the
modal view expounded. As just shown, a formal notation for the semantics of
theoretical sentences is available there. At the same time, is the modal view
capable of retaining those features of the Ramsey view which were considered
merits. This may be shown by comparing notation (2) with the standard nota-
tion for the assertion of a sentence φ in the framework of model-theory, which
goes as follows:
(3) Ai |= φ
where Ai stands for the intended interpretation of the language.7
7Admittedly, model-theory by itself makes no notation for asserting a sentence available.
Unlike Frege’s Begriffsschrift, model-theory does not contain an assertion sign. For this reason,
model-theoretic semantics is best viewed as interpretational semantics in the sense that it
tells us what it is for a sentence to be true only with respect to a particular interpretation
of the non-logical symbols of the language and the specification of the universe in which
the variables are interpreted. This view has been articulated, among others, by Etchemendy
(1999). Likewise, Carnap has pointed out that the model-theoretic apparatus of predicate logic
is apt to clarify the notions of logical truth and logical consequence but makes no contribution
11
In the standard notation, a compositional account of sentence meaning is as-
sumed which leaves no room for contextual aspects of meaning. This contrasts
with the notation (2) in the modal view, where the semantic value of a theo-
retical sentence essentially depends on the theoretical context. For, according
to notation (2), a theoretical sentence is true iff it is true in every admissible
structure. And the range of admissible structures is not only determined by
the intended interpretation of the observational language but also by the pos-
tulates ΦTC . Hence, the meaning of a theoretical sentence is, to some extent,
determined by the axioms of a scientific theory. These axioms can thus be seen
as giving the theoretical context in which theoretical sentences are being as-
serted. Underlying this consideration is a notion of meaning being equated with
Frege’s notion of sense. That is, the sense of an expression is what determines
its extension. Thus, the sense of a sentence is what determines its truth-value.
It can furthermore be shown that the problem of theoretical terms does not
arise in the modal view. In this view, the truth-value of a postulate is not seen
as being determined by the extension of the theoretical terms. The assignment
of truth-values to postulates is rather part of the interpretation of theoretical
terms. Thus, there is, arguably, another solution to the problem of theoreti-
cal terms, in addition to the one given by the Ramsey sentence. For a closer
examination of this point see again Andreas (2007).
The present notation for asserting theoretical sentences can be seen to differ
in two major respects from what has been taken as the standard notation for
such assertions. First, sentences of the object language are allowed to determine
which interpretations of the language are the intended ones. Second, in place of
a single intended interpretation there is now a range of interpretations of which
each single interpretation equally qualifies as being intended. The latter feature
will be exploited in the following attempt to give an explicit modal notation for
the assertion of a theoretical sentence.
A structure for a modal first order language being two-sorted in the manner
described is a sextuple of the following type:
(4) M = 〈W,R,Do, Dt, {Vo,w}w∈W , {Vt}w∈W 〉
where W is a set of states, R an accessibility relation, {Vo,w}w∈W a valuation
function for the Vo symbols, and {Vt,w}w∈W is such a function for predicates
and individual constants of Vt. (For reasons of simplicity it is assumed that
n-place function symbols are represented as (n+1)-place predicates.) These
to an understanding of the notion of factual truth. See Carnap (1973), p. 98n.
To do justice to our plain and representational understanding of truth within the frame-
work of model-theoretic semantics, the notion of an intended interpretation has been invoked
sensibly. (See, e. g., Carnap (1973), p. 101.) An intended interpretation of a formal system
represents the meaning of the non-logical symbols. It can be made explicit by so-called rules
of designation which assign either an intensional or an extensional interpretation to these
symbols by means of expressions of a meta-language, where every intensional interpretation
uniquely determines an extensional one. Of course, the domain in which the variables are
interpreted must also be specified.
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valuation functions are simply assigning an interpretation to the non-logical
symbols of L(Vo, Vt) for every state being a member of W . It is assumed that
the domains of interpretation, Do and Dt, do not vary among the different
states. This assumption holds for the intended interpretations of L(Vo, Vt), as
has been made explicit above.
How can we introduce a set W of states and the accessibility relation R in such
a manner that the resulting modal logic provides us with a means to represent
the semantics of theoretical sentences? In light of what has been said in the last
section, this question is not difficult to answer. The following definitions may
be adopted:
Definition 3. W := Sa, where Sa is the set of admissible structures in the
sense of definition 1.
Definition 4. R := {(x, y) | x ∈W and y ∈W}.
Importantly, R is an equivalence relation such that every member of W is ac-
cessible from any other one, and also from itself, which holds independently of
which L(Vo, Vt) structures are admissible. In such kind of modal structures, the
valuation of a formula with a box operator and the valuation of a formula with
a diamond operator do not depend on the particular state. The semantics of
the modal box and the modal diamond operator can therefore be simplified as
follows:
(5) M, g |=m iff for all v ∈W we have M, g, v |=m φ
(6) M, g |=m ♦φ iff for some v ∈W we have M, g, v |=m φ
where g is a (two-sorted) assignment function for variables and φ a formula of
the language. If φ is a sentence, then g drops out as inessential.
The following proposition is now almost trivial:
Proposition 2. For all L(Vo, Vt) sentences φ: M |=m φ iff Sa |=m φ,
where M |=m φ stands for the claim that the modal first order sentence φ
is true in the modal structure M. It can be proved by applying the rule for the
semantics of the box operator.
Thus, we have obtained another model-theoretic representation of the claim
that a theoretical sentence φ is true:
(7) M |=m φ
whereM is introduced as just described. Moreover, we can say that a theoretical
sentence φ is indeterminate in the sense of definition 2 iff M |=m ♦¬φ ∧ ♦φ.
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So there are two notations for the assertion of a theoretical sentence in the
modal view, one of them being explicitly modal, the other being modal only in
spirit. Both notations give a representation of sentence meaning for theoretical
sentences and therefore solve a major difficulty of the Ramsey view.
The notion of truth encoded by notation (7) bears a certain resemblance with
the notion of T-necessity, according to which φ is T-necessary iff it is logically
implied by the theory T . (See, for example, van Fraassen (1980), p. 201–203.)
Yet these notions are not equivalent. Whereas M |=m φ holds for every
T-necessary sentence, provided the axioms of T are taken as the postulates
ΦTC and MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) is not empty, it does not follow from
M |=m φ that φ is T-necessary. Further, the intent of notation (7) is to
explicate ordinary truth of scientific statements and not a kind of necessary
truth being independent of empirical facts.
5 Deductive Reasoning
A second difficulty that was found in section 2 to inhere the Ramsey view
concerns deductive reasoning. If a theoretical sentence φ is translated to (TC ∧
φa∧φ)R in this view, then the resulting notation can hardly be used for drawing
inferences from φ. It is therefore difficult to see how the Ramsey view may
account for inferential practice in science. There, theoretical sentences are used
in deductions without any substitutions of the theoretical terms by second order
variables in the Ramsey style. If a theoretical sentence is taken to mean the
difference between (TC ∧φa ∧φ)R and (TC ∧φa)R, then the resulting notation
is not sufficiently formal for being used in deductions. Do we have to resort, for
these reasons, to the standard view when an account of deductive reasoning in
science is called for? This is not necessary. Rather, we will show that the modal
view is also capable of giving such an account, provided non-monotonic aspects
of scientific reasoning are set aside and classical first order logic is considered a
proper explication of deductions in science.
Two notations were given for the assertion of a theoretical sentence in the modal
view: i) Sa |=m φ, and ii) M |=m φ. The first notation does - with respect
to the right side of the symbol of the satisfaction relation - not differ from the
standard view, in which the assertion of φ is represented by Ai |= φ, where Ai
is the intended interpretation of the language. Let us adopt any logical first
order calculus being complete and sound with respect to standard first order
semantics as the logical part of the deductive system corresponding to notation
i) of the modal view. For notation ii), which is explicitly modal, the modal
system S5 suggests itself as logical part of the deductive system.
Let us assume that classical first order logic is apt to account for inferential
practice in science. Then, we can say that the modal view in the form of notation
i) (Sa |=m φ) accords with inferential practice in science if the adoption of a
classical deductive system can be justified for deductions with propositions in
this notation. Now, in classical logic, a proof of soundness and completeness
of the deductive system is considered a justification of this system, provided
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truth-conditional semantics is adopted. What we have to show therefore is that
the logical part of a classical deductive system is also complete and sound with
respect to the peculiar relation of semantic consequence we are concerned with
in the modal view. In the modal view, we have a preference for inferences
that are truth-preserving in the sense that if the premisses are true in a set of
structures, then the conclusion is also true in this set of structures. Let us be a
bit more explicit about semantic consequences in the modal view:
Definition 5. A sentence φ is a semantic consequence of a set Φ of sentences
in the modal view - in symbols: Φ |=m φ - iff it holds that Sa |=m φ whenever
Sa |=m Φ for any set Sa of admissible structures in the sense of definition 1.
Proposition 3. For all sets Φ of L(Vo, Vt) sentences and all sentences φ of
L(Vo, Vt): Φ |=m φ iff Φ |= φ.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, assume that Φ |=m φ, where the members
of Φ and φ itself are L(Vo, Vt) sentences. As assumption of the indirect proof,
suppose that Φ |= φ does not hold, i. e., φ is not a classical semantic consequence
of Φ. Then, there is a structure A1 = (Do1, Dt1, ao1, at1) such that A1 |= Φ but
not A1 |= φ. Now, we need to construct a set Sa1 of structures in the sense of
definition 1 such that A1 ∈ Sa1. For this, take Ao1 = (Do1, ao1) as intended
interpretation of L(Vo). Then, let Φ1 be the set of sentences that are members
of Φ and have occurrences of theoretical terms. Further, take Φ1 as the set of
postulates for defining the set of admissible structures. Then, we obtain Sa1 =
MOD(Φ1) ∩ EXT(Ao1, Vt, Dt). Since A1 ∈ MOD(Φ1) and A1 ∈ EXT(Ao1, Vt,
Dt), it holds that A1 ∈ Sa1. By assumption we know that Φ |=m φ. From this,
A1 ∈ Sa1, and Sa1 |=m Φ, we can infer that A1 |= φ. Contradiction.
For the right-to-left direction, assume that Φ |= φ. As assumption of an indirect
proof, suppose that Φ |=m φ does not hold. So, there is a set Sa1 of structures
such that Sa1 |=m Φ but not Sa1 |=m φ. Hence, there is at least one structure
A1 ∈ Sa1 such that A1 |= Φ but not A1 |= φ. Therefore, Φ |= φ does not hold.
Contradiction.
By proposition 3 we know that once a classical logical calculus being sound and
complete with respect to classical first order semantics is adopted for notation
i) of the modal view, the resulting deductive system is sound and complete with
respect to the semantics of the modal view. This justifies the adoption of a
classical logical calculus. Hence, we can say that the modal view in the form
of notation i) accords with inferential practice in science to the extent in which
the standard view accords with this practice. This seems like an important
advantage that the modal view has to the Ramsey view.
Let us now move to the explicit modal notation of the modal view. Admittedly,
this notation does not accord with inferential practice in science because modal
operators are used in science only very rarely. At least, ordinary scientific
statements are - contrary to the suggestion of the modal view in the form of
notation ii) - not prefixed by a modal operator. It seems feasible, however, to
recognize a relation between deductions in the modal view and deductions in a
classical deductive system in view of the following proposition:
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Proposition 4. For all finite sets Φ of first order sentences not containing
modal operators and all first order sentences φ not containing such an operator:
Φ `S5 φ iff Φ ` φ.
`S5 designates derivability in the modal system S5 and ` derivability in a com-
plete and sound axiomatization of first order logic. A proof can be obtained
using deduction theorem.
By this proposition we know that if we were to adopt the modal view in the form
of the modal notation for making assertions and drawing inferences in science,
we would obtain a relation of derivability that is equivalent to derivability in
the standard view. Such a result was not obtained for the Ramsey view.
The purpose of the modal view is merely to gain a semantic insight into the
nature of human theorizing. This view can be seen as a semantic adjustment of
the standard view, which leaves the deductions corresponding to the standard
view intact.
6 A Note on Competing Theories
In a certain sense, the modal view elucidates a theory-immanent notion of
truth. Consider two theories, T1 and T2, such that each is compatible with
the observational facts, but from T1 ∪ T2 a contradiction can be derived.
(These conditions are satisfied by empirically equivalent and yet logically in-
compatible theories.) In the modal view, we would then be able to introduce
two modal operators, 1 and 2, where Wi = MOD(ΦTi) ∩ EXT(Ao, Vti,
Dti), i=1,2. The semantics of these operators is based on modal structures
of the type M = 〈W1,W2, R1, R2, Do, Dt1, Dt2, {Vo1,w}w∈W1 , {Vo2,w}w∈W2 ,
{Vt1}w∈W1 , {Vt2}w∈W2〉 in a manner being analogous to definition 5. If, then,
from T1 a sentence φ1 can be derived, while ¬φ1 is derivable from T2, this im-
plies that M |=m 1φ1 and M |=m 2¬φ1, provided MOD(ΦTi)∩ EXT(Ao, Vti,
Dti), i=1,2, is not empty. There is then no danger of inconsistent assignments
of semantic values to one and the same sentence. Nor becomes the deductive
system contradictory in this case, even though both theories are formulated in
one and the same language.
The admission of different, not necessarily converging conceptions of truth at
the theoretical level within the modal view seems to accord with certain an-
tirealist intuitions about theoretical truth and will also appeal to advocates of
a historically relativized notion of truth. But such a liberal view of truth at
the theoretical level may equally well serve as an objection to the modal view,
particularly since this view provides - in its present exposition - no means to
account for a non-theory-immanent notion of truth, according to which com-
peting theories have the same claim to truth. To this objection we reply that
the modal view may enable us to discover new implications of the positions that
are involved in the debate about realism and antirealism. Notably, the kind of
antirealism that may eventually be based upon the modal view differs from the
kind of antirealism that Dummett (1991) advocated since the modal view does -
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unlike intuitionistic logic - not require a revision of inferential practice in science.
Another move available as a reply to the objection is to dismiss the proposal of
allowing the introduction of different modal box operators through which dif-
ferent, not necessarily converging concepts of truth are admitted. Then, both
of two contradictory theories would be a member of ΦTC and MOD(ΦTC) ∩
EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) would be empty. But the latter reply seems less congenial to
the spirit of the modal view.
If the modal view is rejected because of a prior preference for a more absolute
notion of truth, one is left with no minor challenge. One would then have to
show that it is not sensible to explicate the semantics of scientific expressions
along the lines of theoretical terms. Alternatively, one may try to show that the
determination of theoretical terms through the axioms of a scientific theory is
such that the extension of these terms is uniquely determined.
7 Conclusion
A major difficulty in formally representing the semantics of theoretical sentences
arises from there not being a unique determination of theoretical terms through
postulates, which are supposed to interpret these terms. Aside from special
cases, there is a range of interpretations of the theoretical language L(Vo, Vt)
that extend a given interpretation of the observational language L(Vo) and sat-
isfy the postulates. In the Ramsey view this problem does not arise because
the Ramsey sentence implies no assertion about the uniqueness of interpreta-
tion of the theoretical terms. But we have seen that the Ramsey view suffers
from another difficulty, namely the formal representation of the assertion of a
theoretical sentence. For this reason, deductive reasoning with theoretical sen-
tences can hardly be represented in the Ramsey view. These two, interrelated
difficulties are overcome by the modal view expounded in the present paper.
The basic idea of the modal view is to introduce a notion of truth according
to which a sentence is true iff it is true in every admissible structure. The set
of admissible structures is defined as the set of L(Vo, Vt) structures extending a
given L(Vo) structure and satisfying the postulates, provided there is any struc-
ture meeting these conditions. This notion of truth allows theoretical sentences
to have determinate values, even in the absence of a unique interpretation of
theoretical terms by postulates. The introduction of an explicit modal notation
for the assertion of a theoretical sentence is then straight forward.
What we have been arguing for is that scientific statements are better under-
stood as propositions of the form M |=m φ than as propositions of the form
A |= φ, where M encompasses a range of intended interpretations, while A des-
ignates a single intended interpretation. Hence, the divergence of the modal
view from standard semantics consists in rejecting the assumption of a unique
intended interpretation of the language in which a scientific theory is couched.
The justification of this divergence is again straight forward in light of the
above considerations: Once we are convinced that there are theoretical terms,
i. e., non-logical symbols that get their meaning determined through the axioms
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of a scientific theory, the assumption of a unique intended interpretation being
essential to standard semantics is not tenable any more.
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